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ABSTRACT 
Public-Private  Partnerships  (PPP)  or  Private  Finance  Initiatives  (PFI)  are  increasingly  becoming  very 
popular with governments across the globe for the provision of public infrastructure and services. When 
contracted,  the  public  sector  client  believing  the  private  sector  will  act  in  accordance  with  ‘bounded 
rationality’, ignores the constant monitoring and review process which is an integral part of any project. 
However, the failures of some of these partnerships and the social and economic costs incurred due to laxity 
in monitoring reminds us of the need to develop the permanent bureaucratic  machinery of government, who 
share the government’s unique objectives of end-users satisfaction rather than shareholders’, to perform the 
monitoring  of  these  projects.  Though  the  public  sector  has  been  delivering  projcets  for  dacades,  the 
complexities associated with  the PFI strategy has opened up new challenges for its staff. Most failures and 
moral harzards are only discovered after scandals evoke  investigations like the case of Enron or when 
public criticisms force the government to reverse their decision as in the case of the Skye toll bridge by 
which time a lot of damage would have be done. Literature has shown that when employees are trained and 
engaged in organisational decisions and policy planning they make policy executions easier. Therefore, 
considering the Theoretical ideology behind the PFI of the asset being returned to the Public sector at the 
end of the concession, it becomes pertinent for proper training of the public sector staff. Public sector 
officials,  if  adequately  trained  and  motivated  can  perform  the  tasks  being  contracted  out  to  private 
consultants  thereby  re-affirming  government’s  commitment  to  its Value  for  Money  (VFM)  proposition. 
Though the public sector staff strength has been depleted due to the adoption of New Public Management 
(NPM),  however  the  remaining  qualified  staff  can  be  pooled  to  create  an  ‘incubator’  from  which  a 
formidable monitoring team would evolve through the use of project management ‘Core Team concept’. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
  Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) or Private Finance 
Initiatives  (PFI)  projects  have  become  increasingly 
popular among governments across the world; this may 
not be unconnected  with the fact that it helps provide 
public services faster and at the least cost to government.  
“Public  Private  Partnerships  is  a  partnership  that 
leverages  private  funding  and  the  strengths  of  private 
entrepreneurship  and  management,  for  the  maximum 
provision  of  public  services  in  a  climate  of  scarce 
resources. PFI is a PPP special case where all the finance 
needed for the capital funding and its basic operation is 
supplied  by  the  private  sector  in  return  for  a  service 
charge” (Fewings, 2005). “PFI, in its purest form, is a 
Design,  Build,  Finance  and  Operate  (DBFO)  system. 
There are a number of factors that have given rise to the 
use of this procurement strategy and these factors differ 
from  one  country  to  another,  while  some  believe  it 
“offers  better  value  for  money  than  the  Public  Sector Abdullahi Ahmed Umar et al. / American Journal of Engineering and Applied Sciences 5 (4) (2012) 301-309 
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Comparator (PSC) (Parker and Hartley, 2003), for others 
it  is  used  to  “manage  design  risks,  time  and  cost 
overruns” (Fewings, 2005); in Malaysia, it is used “to 
attract private sector capital and expertise in developing 
infrastructure  assets  and  services”  (Siang,  2008). 
Internationally and particularly in developing countries, 
PPP/PFI is seen as attractive in terms of its capacity to 
achieve the transfer of technological knowledge to local 
enterprises  and  bring  in  international  finance  for  local 
project  development.  Another  reason  for  the  thrust 
towards this procurement strategy is government desire to 
regain the amount of control it lost to the private sector 
under the various privatisation programmes coupled with 
the political risks and national security concerns.  
  However, in spite of what has been written about the 
benefits  of  PPPs/PFIs  there  are  counter  arguments,  a 
study by (Blanc-Brude et al., 2009) observed that “the 
ex-ante  unit  construction  cost  of  a  road  to  the  public 
sector is estimated to be 24% higher in a PPP than in 
traditional public procurement”, though they were quick 
to point out  that the difference represents  the costs of 
construction  risks  the  private  sector  is  saddled  with. 
However, “whether PFI is, in fact, cheaper in monetary 
terms is difficult to assess because the project that results 
is not necessarily the same as that which would have 
been  funded  using  conventional  finance”  (Froud, 
2003). It should not also be forgotten that the public 
sector  can  borrow  money  more  cheaply  than  the 
private sector. Most of the services outsourced under 
PPPs are  critical  infrastructures,  which  are  “systems 
or  assets  vital  to  a  country  that  any  extended 
incapacity or destruction of such systems would have 
a  debilitating  impact  on  security,  the  economy, 
national public health or safety or any combination of 
the  above”  (Dunn-Cavelty  and  Suter,  2009).  Public 
services  “provide  an  infrastructure  on  which  people 
can build autonomous and worthwhile lives” (Fisher, 
1998),  therefore,  owing  to  the  importance  of  these 
types  of  services  there  is  a  need  to  improve  the 
internal  capability  of  the  public  sector  officials  to 
properly  govern,  monitor,  report  and  advise  the 
government on all risk prone areas of the concessions.  
  This  study  seeks  to  highlight  some  of  the  skills 
required  by  public  sector  officials  monitoring  PPP 
projects  and  suggest  ways  of  overcoming  the  present 
skills  inadequacy;  this  has  become  necessary  as  the 
continued reliance on independent consultants to monitor 
these  projects  due  to  limited  expertise  in  the  public 
sector invariably increases the total transaction costs of 
the project to the public sector. A report by the National 
Audit Office in the UK found that “departments spent 
£789 million on consultants and an additional £215 on 
interims (temporary workers) in the years 2009-2010. In 
the same report, the spending on consultants was £904 
million in 2006-2007, while the spending fell by £126 
million in 2007-2008” (NAO, 2010). This practice can 
also lead to the loss of internal capability due to retiring 
or transferring staff as some concession contracts include 
staff transfer clauses. Another reason for the decline in 
PPP/PFI internal capabilities in the public sector can be 
linked to the New Public Management (NPM) which is a 
form of public sector reform being carried out across the 
globe;  these  reforms  have  come  in  the  form  of 
downsizing  and  cut  backs  on  public  spending.  These 
downsizing  have  led  to  Independent  consultants  being 
contracted  to  monitor  PPP/PFI  projects,  however  the 
issues  at  stake  is  that  they  are  private-for-profit 
organisations  that  do  not  share  the  same  ideology  of 
“social profits” with their Public Sector principals, the 
occurrences at Enron, WorldCom, Nortel and a number 
of other PPP/PFI projects have since shown that constant 
and effective monitoring of the activities of organisations 
providing public services by public sector official needs 
to be taken more seriously. 
1.1.  Investments in PPPS 
  In  developing  countries,  “investment  in 
infrastructure,  particularly  during  the  early  stages  of 
development,  is  of  crucial  importance  as  it  sets  the 
framework for subsequent investment by both public and 
private sectors (Todaro and Smith, 2009). “A joint Asian 
Development  Bank,  Japan  Bank  for  International  Co-
operation  and  World  Bank  estimate  is  that  East  Asia 
alone has infrastructure needs totaling US$200 billion a 
year over the next five years. Around two-thirds of this 
expenditure  needs  to  be  new  investment,  with  the 
balance on upkeep of existing assets” (Siang, 2008). In 
Taiwan,  after  the  enactment  of  the  PPP  Act,  “many 
public agencies have encouraged private sector entities 
to invest in public projects. 
  As  of  the  end  of  2008,  private  investment  totaled 
nearly 382 billion NT dollars (about US$ 11.5 billion)” 
PCC,  2009,  “the World  Bank  also  found  that  between 
1994 and 1999 the total private investment in Indonesian 
infrastructure was more than US$20 billion with private 
participation” (Abednego and Ogunlana, 2006). 
  Developed  countries  are  also  not  left  out  of  the 
PPP/PFI  ‘party’  as  PPP/PFI  are  not  restricted  to  only 
“green  field”  developments  but  are  also  crafted  to 
accommodate  “Brown  field”  improvements.  Broadbent 
and Laughlin (2003), in the UK, “the driving force for 
PFI is HM Treasury in the heart of the government. As a Abdullahi Ahmed Umar et al. / American Journal of Engineering and Applied Sciences 5 (4) (2012) 301-309 
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result PFI is actively pursued with some 450 contracts 
worth over 50 billion pounds underway or completed”. 
  In  the  African  sub-continent,  speaking  at  a 
conference in South Africa, KPMG’s infrastructure and 
projects director for Africa Johan Greyling observed that 
“the continent was only spending about half of what was 
required to bridge the infrastructure backlog, at around 
$45-billion a year, when it really should be spending about 
$95-billion a year” (Prinsloo, 2011). In Malaysia under the 
Ninth  Malaysian  Plan,  the  government  identified  425 
projects worth RM 20 billion to be procured through PFI 
(Rashid, 2007),  while in the present 10th MP, “52 high-
impact projects worth RM63 billion have been identified for 
implementation” EPU, 2010. 
1.2.  The Need for Monitoring 
  Monitoring  is  an  essential  element  for  achieving 
project success, (Cleland, 1999) “Monitoring gives early 
warning  of  the  possibility  of  contractor’s  delays  and 
helps in anticipating the consequences of changes that 
may be needed”. It is done to gather relevant information 
for  the  purpose  of  reporting  to  the  relevant  authority 
saddled  with  decision-making  authority  so  that  action 
can be taken to mitigate any risks which may threaten the 
attainment of the laid down objectives. “Environmental 
scanning generates a lot of information. That information 
only becomes knowledge when it is assessed against the 
values and beliefs of those in the organisation” (Doherty 
and  Horne,  2002).  PPPs  in  contrast  to  traditional 
procurement, encapsulate any public service supplied by 
a  private  firm,  it  could  be  a  concession  or  a  fully 
privatised entity, in as much as the government still 
regulates its operations especially service quality and 
price and is protected from competition, it falls under 
the category of a PPP/PFI, this distinction is provided 
by (Broadbent and Laughlin, 2003) who observed that 
“a key element in differentiating the two sectors (PFI 
amd Privatisation) is the existence of a regime of state 
price regulations”. 
  Most PPP/PFI deals are undertaken using the Build-
Operate  and  Transfer  (BOT)  or  Design-Build-Finance-
Operate  (DBFO)  models  for  those  requiring  “green 
field” developments before the contracted services can 
be provided. “However, some unsuccessful BOT projects 
alert  us  that  BOT  is  not  a  sure-win  business”  (Tam, 
1999), the success of a public sector project is not only in 
the interest of the profit-seeking private sector but also in 
the interest of the public sector that identified the need 
for the project in fulfilling their social responsibility of 
providing  the  project.  “The  concerns  are  not  about 
technical  abilities  of  the  suppliers  but  rather  the 
commercial  and  contractual  maneuvering  that  is  often 
employed  at  the  expense  of  the  overall  project 
objectives”  (Hall  et  al.,  2003).  In  terms  of  financial 
reporting, “managers smooth or manage earnings upward 
to please investors” (Dechow and Skinner, 2000) cited in 
(Scott, 2009), however on the heels of the Enron scandal, 
these same managers adopted the opposite approach “to 
minimize  wealth  transfers  from  political  solutions  as 
predicted by the political cost explanation” (Scott, 2009). 
In  the  UK  also,  “the  National  Audit  Office  has  also 
criticised  the  profits  made  by  private  companies  on 
certain  PFI  deals  (NAO,  2008)  cited  in  (Parker  and 
Hartley,  2003),  this  type  of  occurrences  coupled  with 
failures like those experienced in Enron where regulatory 
laxity  led  to  the  loss  of  billions  of  dollars  in  equity 
investments,  retirement  benefits  and  unquantifiable 
‘Social  profit’  has  brought  the  issues  of  effective 
monitoring to the fore. 
  In order to achieve success in any PPP/PFI project, 
(Tusk-Advisory,  2011)  identified  five  components  as 
being critical, these are:  
 
·  Political courage and legislative leadership 
·  Funding commitment and pipeline creation 
·  Regulations and governance of delivery 
·  Correct PPP model and optimal risk sharing 
·  Industry capacity and community support  
 
  Of all the above listed, Regulation and governance 
of delivery, is of paramount importance for PFI projects 
due to their uniquely long-term nature and the complex 
contractual and financial arrangements which are often 
dictated by the private sector supplier. The public sector 
has “social benefits” as its main objectives in PPP/PFI 
deals  while  the  private  sector  seeks  “return  on 
investments”  for  its  shareholders.  El-Gohary  et  al. 
(2006)  “the  involvement  of  the  private  sector-with  its 
profit-making  mindset-usually  raises  concerns  that  are 
not likely when the asset is publicly owned”. Therefore 
with the public sector expected to be transparent in its 
transaction with private sector organisations, there is a 
lot of pressure on them to monitor performance and more 
recently  environmental  issues  closely,  this  is  because 
“fixed  capital  formation  through  PPP  projects  has 
become  big  enough  to  have  macroeconomic  and 
systemic significance in a number of countries” (Blanc-
Brude  et  al.,  2009).  Hence  “there  are  concerns  that 
unless  contracts  are  tightly  specified,  private  firms 
might economise on the quality of output (Parker and 
Hartley,  2003)    because  “mega  projects  clearly  bring 
together,  under  various  contractual  arrangement, 
differing and competing partners, interests, values and 
modes  of  rationality  (ways  of  doing  and  thinking)” 
(Marrewijk et al., 2008). Abdullahi Ahmed Umar et al. / American Journal of Engineering and Applied Sciences 5 (4) (2012) 301-309 
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Fig. 1. PPP Structure, Source: MOF (2004) 
 
1.3. The Challenges in Monitoring 
  PPP/PFI  projects  are  usually  let  on  the  BOT  or 
DBFO  procurement  method  or  other  variants  of  it, 
therefore the skills required in contract administration of 
PPP/PFI  is  somewhat  different  from  those  the  public 
sector  were  used  to  under  the  traditional  procurement. 
“not  only  are  PFI/PPP  projects  amongst  the  most 
complex from a management perspective, the differing 
objective  between the public and private sectors  and the 
public  expectations  can  lead  to  difficult  relationships” 
(Walker,  2007).  “Social,  economic,  political  and 
technological change is inevitable: while the details of 
changes  cannot  be  accurately  predicted,  the  fact  of 
change  is  inescapable  and  is  one  of  the  distinctive 
hallmarks  of  a  progressive  society”  (Froud,  2003) 
commenting further on the uncertainties inherent in long-
term contracts (Parker and Hartley, 2003) observed that 
“It  is  difficult  to  write  complete  contingent  claims 
contracts  (allowing  for  uncertain  events)  especially 
where  contracts  cover  lengthy  period  of  time, 
technologies  and  costs  are  inherently  uncertain  or  the 
economic environment is in a state of flux”, hence “If 
government  relies  on  third  parties  and  empowered 
employees  to  achieve  public  purposes,  it  will  have  to 
monitor their performance” (Rosenbloom et al., 2008). 
Essentially, (Doh and Ramamurti, 2003) “Governments 
serve four important roles in infrastructure namely: 
 
·  Sponsor/investor 
·  Consumer/Customer 
·  Rule maker/Regulator 
·  Mediator/Moderator of political opposition 
 
  Figure 1 above shows the dependence of the public 
sector  on  external  consultants.  This  results  due  to  the 
inadequate PFI contracting skills within the public sector. 
The effects include increased transaction costs, resulting 
from th professional fees of the various consultants that 
would be engaged throughout the life cycle of the project 
and  the  further  decline  in  the  public  sector’s  internal 
capability, due to prolonged lack of engagement of its 
staff who should be learning PFI–related skills through 
their involvement on projects.  In another work (Jacobs, 
1994),  noted  that  “Governments  throughout  the  world 
engage in three main activities: They tax, they spend and 
they regulate. Regulation is the least understood”. Brux 
(2010)  also  observed  that  “Public  sector  has  weak 
expertise in negotiations and contract governance”. The 
challenges  may  come  in  the  form  of  technical  or 
technological, financial, contractual, environmental, risk Abdullahi Ahmed Umar et al. / American Journal of Engineering and Applied Sciences 5 (4) (2012) 301-309 
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management  and  stakeholder  management  challenges. 
“The public procurement workforce of today is supposed 
to  master  all  these  contracting  skill  areas,  as  well  as 
others  and  also  to  conduct  operations  in  innovative 
ways” (Lawther and Martin, 2005).  
1.4.  Inadequate Technical Skills 
  There are a lot of technical challenges confronting 
the public sector officials on PPP/PFI projects and this 
result from their changed role of specifying inputs under 
the  traditional  procurement.  “To  control  quality  the 
public  sector  moved  from  input  specification  as  a 
benchmark  for  comparing  bid  prices  to  a  normalised 
position of procuring services upon performance criteria 
established  in  output  specifications;  Key  Performance 
Indicators (KPIs) being used to ensure requirements are 
met over project life cycles” (Smyth and Edkins, 2007). 
This new position has sprung its own challenges, (RICS, 
2003)  found  that  “managers  are  often  not  adequately 
skilled at driving PFI projects forward and that in the 
best  PFI  projects  a  partnership  of  skills  between  the 
public and private sectors is required” while (Li et al., 
2005) noted that “the concept of PPP is comparatively 
less well understood in countries with a strong public 
welfare policy” and “public procurement partnerships 
create  administrative  and  implementation  challenges 
for  public  procurement  professionals  that  are  not 
found in more traditional procurements” (Lawther and 
Martin,  2005).  “The  lack  of  understanding  and  the 
need for better training by public officials involved in 
PPP/PFI  projects  is  a  major  issue”  (Morledge  and 
Owen, 1998).  
1.5.  Inadequate Financial Management Skills 
  The  financial  monitoring  in  PPP/PFI  projects  is 
somewhat unclear; this is because the public sector is not 
committing any monies to the project under a ‘pure’ PFI 
project.  However  certain  decisions  of  the  government 
can affect the finances of the private sector provider, for 
instance the interest rates, would affect the cost of capital 
to the private sector. Another issue is in the area of re-
financing,  some  private  providers  usually  seek  re-
financing after the contract has been entered into with 
the government in order to get more favorable repayment 
terms,  though  in  some  countries  such  as  the  UK, 
provision has now been made for both parties to share 
the gains of such re-financing deals, but in reality this 
has  not  be  truly  achieved.  There  has  evolved  new 
financial instruments developed by the private sector in 
collaboration  with  financial  institutions  to  increase 
profitability and retain their shareholders. In a study by 
(Scott,  2009),  he  observed  that  during  the  post-Enron 
era,  “firms  used  several  accounting  charges  including 
special  items,  discontinued  operations,  asset  write-offs 
and  goodwill  impairment  charges  to  decrease  reported 
income.  Before  political  sensitivity,  the  majority  of 
special items in the industry were income increasing”.  
  The public sector lacks adequate knowledge of these 
financial manueverings and has led to situations where 
“the  unitary  charge  is  itself  derived  from  a  financial 
model of the provider’s entire forecast cash flows which 
include financing and borrowing” (Cartlidge, 2012).  
1.6.  Inadequate Contract Administration Skills 
  PPP projects are a bit different from the traditional 
procurement method which many public sector officials 
have become used to over the last few decades, one of 
the major differences is in the mode of evaluation and 
payment  for  work  properly  done.  Where  under  the 
traditional  procurement  methods  during  construction, 
work properly done till date is valued by professionals or 
consultants working for the client and advises the client 
on  what  amount  is  due  the  contractor  under  ‘interim 
certificates’,  on  PPP/PFI  projects  the  contractor  is 
responsible for financing the project and starts earning 
once  the  project  is  functional.  “Services  contracting, 
information technology and knowledge development all 
require  specialised  contracting  expertise  and  skills” 
(Lawther and Martin, 2005). Furthermore, the “PPP/PFI 
imposes a new and more complex procurement process 
on the public sector, it is part tendering and part contract 
negotiation among public bodies, private sector consortia 
and their advisers” (Li et al., 2005).  
1.7.  Risk Management Expertise 
  Proper risk management is another area where the 
private  sector  is  ahead  of  the  public  sector,  this  is 
because they are more enterprising and are always on the 
lookout for anything that will threaten their profitability. 
“However, with the advent of NPM and the adoption of 
modern  procurement  methods  there  is  increasing 
understanding  that  financial  aspects  of  projects  are 
influenced by the good management of risks” (Grimsey 
and  Lewis,  2002),  “a  2009  review  by  the  Office  of 
Government  Commerce  (OGC)  in  the  UK  found  that 
44% of Senior Responsible Owners of major projects did 
not have any substantial commercial experience” (NAO, 
2009).  For  “multinational  companies  that  are  project 
driven, risk management takes on paramount importance. 
Not all companies, especially in undeveloped countries, 
have  an  understanding  of  risks  management  or  its 
importance.  These  countries  sometimes  view  risk Abdullahi Ahmed Umar et al. / American Journal of Engineering and Applied Sciences 5 (4) (2012) 301-309 
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management  as  an  ‘over-management’  expense  on  a 
project (Kerzner, 2006). 
1.8.  Stakeholder Management Skills 
  The  civil  service  has  always  carried  with  it  the 
image of just delivering public services to the general 
public  without  recourse  to  whether  the  populace  are 
satisfied or not since they do not look forward to being 
blamed individually or fear losing a comeback to their 
positions because they are not usually elected into these 
government agencies. This realisation has limited their 
eagerness to learn people management skills which could 
come in handy when monitoring projects where people 
issues create a threat to the successful execution of such 
projects. Hence when conflicts occur, especially within 
the private partner’s team or between other stakeholders 
affected  by  the  project,  the  public  servants  often  shy 
away from interfering not realising that these conflicts 
have  a  direct  impact  on  the  project  at  hand  and  will 
reflect  on  their  performance.  In  dealing  with  these 
conflicts,  “the  project  sponsor  is  ideally  placed  to 
identify  issues  of  concern  and  areas  for  improving 
management  practices  within  the  construction  project 
management” (Hall et al., 2003).  
1.9. Lack  of  Environmental  Management 
Knowledge 
  Global  warming  has  added  a  new  chapter  to  the 
‘book  of  skills’  required  by  the  public  sector  project 
sponsors  and  their  representatives.  “Sustainability  is  a 
recent  major  issue  that  has  emerged  as  a  powerful 
environmental  force  on  the  construction  industry” 
(Walker,  2007).  It  is  usually  difficult  for  the  private 
sector  provider  to  integrate  it  unless  the  public  sector 
client insists on it, this is because of the additional costs 
of  hiring  ‘green  experts’  to  advice  on  sustainability 
related  issue  on  a  project.  “It  is  possible  for  public 
services  to  score  highly  on  the  traditional  3  ‘E’s  of 
Economy, Efficiency and Effectiveness, while failing to 
meet the needs of the community” (Flynn, 1997) cited in 
(Doherty  and  Horne,  2002).  The  public  sector 
monitoring teams owe it as a duty to protect the end-
users, community and the government from the effects 
and repercussions of this issue. However, recently there 
has been a reinvigorated pressure for the consideration of 
environmental  impact  of  not  only  PPP  projects  but  all 
other human activities, this has further raised the bar of 
skills  required  by  the  public  sector  officials  divided 
between  providing  the  much  needed  infrastructure 
services  yet  protecting  the  environment  from  the 
damaging effects of construction activities and processes 
through which these infrastructures are provided.  
 
 
Fig. 2. Core team structure, Source: (Wysocki, 2007) 
 
1.10. Overcoming  the  Challenges-Some 
Suggestions 
  One of the major reason for low internal capability 
of PPP/PFI skills in the public sector is staff shortage, 
however  (Doherty  and  Horne,  2002)  “Shortages  of 
trained  staff  cannot  be  solved  in  the  medium  term  by 
more  money.  Existing  staff  need  to  be  managed  more 
efficiently and more individually”. This shortage of staff 
is occasioned by staff transfers to the concessionaire in 
line  with  NPM  resulting  in  reducing  the  government 
administrative  load  and  wages  commitment  to  these 
staff.  In  the  UK,  “from  1995  to  November  2004  it  is 
estimated that 35,000 staff transferred from the public to 
the  private  sector  as  a  result  of  PPP/PFI  (Partnerships 
UK) cited in (NAO, 2008). To manage the shortfall of 
qualified  staff  created  by  these  transfers,  the  project 
management  Core  Team  approach  (Fig.  2)  should  be 
implemented  in  order  to  bring  together  the  available 
experts  to  form  a  pool  of  critical  resources  required 
across all project types. A core team “comprise of a small 
number of Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) chosen and 
managed by the Core Team Manager. The SMEs of the 
core Team consult, advice and support the work of all the 
teams working on the project” Wysocki (2007). 
  In the area of inadequate financial management or 
commercial skills, “there is no substitute for experience 
gained  from  delivering  projects,  basic  commercial 
principles  and  realities  do  need  to  be  embedded  and 
refreshed throughout the careers of individuals tasked in 
project  delivery”  (Smith  et  al.,  2009)  through  lessons 
learned  documentation,  seminars,  conferences  and 
training. The core team should also be mandated to “act 
in  an  advisory,  coaching  or  mentoring  capacity  on 
technical  and  business  matters  at  the  invitation  of  the 
individual team members, regardless of the business unit 
to which they are aligned” Wysocki (2007). Andrew and 
Sofian  (2011)  in  their  study  on  engaging  people  who 
drive  execution  of  organisational  goals  found  that  co-Abdullahi Ahmed Umar et al. / American Journal of Engineering and Applied Sciences 5 (4) (2012) 301-309 
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employee support was a major driver that influence job 
engagement  and  organization  engagement.  Hence, 
engaging  employees  by  the  public  sector  in  all  areas 
where PFI skills are required would help enhance their 
on-the-job  experience  and  ensure  the  success  of  such 
projects and future ones.  
  As  has  been  observed  by  many  commentators  on 
PFI  and  its  contractibility,  “It  is  difficult  to  write 
complete  contingent  claims  contracts  (allowing  for 
uncertain  events)  especially  where  contracts  cover  a 
lengthy  period  of  time,  technologies  and  costs  are 
inherently uncertain or the economic environment is in a 
state  of  flux  (Parker  and  Hartley,  2003).  Therefore  it 
becomes  pertinent  for  the  public  sector  officials  to  be 
well aware of this and try to create an environment of 
mutual  respect  between  both  parties  while  not  taking 
their eyes off the main objectives of the project.  
  Policy  monitoring  is  another  area  which  requires 
attention,  “as  the  authority-in-charge  of  public 
Participation in Infrastructure Projects (PPIP) in Taiwan, 
Public  Construction  Commission  (PCC)  actively 
promotes private participation, enhances the coordination 
and  assistance  in  each  PPI  project  and  facilitates 
regulation relaxation. Its purpose is to expand the scope 
of  PPIP  and  improve  the  environment  for  its 
implementation”  PCC,  2009.  The  private  sector  also 
benefits from effective project monitoring; this much was 
evident in the New Pantai Highway project (in Malaysia) 
where  “the government agreed to revise the concession 
agreement to take into consideration the actual situation of 
problems caused by squatters (Rashid, 2007). Had there 
not been effective on-site monitoring, disputes would have 
arisen as to the extent to which the squatters impacted the 
progress and performance of the project. 
  Public  servants  with  sector-specific  skills  should 
also be included in the monitoring team, where they are 
not available there should be a concerted effort to attract 
and  retain  them  within  the  public  sector  with  good 
remuneration  packages.  Writing  about  ethics  in  water 
management, (Moorthy and Jeyabalan, 2011) concluded 
that “it is fundamental to infuse the knowledge of ‘water 
ethics’  among  water  managers,  institutions  and  the 
general  public  and  into  water  policy  formulation  and 
implementation initiatives” 
  Like  in  all  activities  involving  monitoring,  proper 
documentation  is  required  so  that  (Berggren  and 
Soderlund, 2008) “Individual learning can be turned into 
collective learning and individual learning can be further 
developed  if  articulated  by  writing  reflection  reports” 
this is why “managers in public services are increasingly 
required to act as coaches and mentors and to ensure that 
employees  develop  the  knowledge  and  understanding 
that  underpin a broad range  of competencies (Doherty 
and  Horne,  2002).  Finally,  “a  cooperative  and 
uncorrupted  supervising  authority  is  required  in 
managing BOT contracts” (Tam, 1999).  
2. CONCLUSION 
  Value  for  money  is  at  the  heart  of  any  government 
procurement, with the government being the largest client 
of the construction industry and other numerous industries 
at least in developing countries, there is a need for its staff 
to  be  well  equipped  in  all  the  rudiments  of  contract 
administration especially now with the thrust towards PFI. 
Monitoring of projects helps anticipate difficulties that may 
hinder the success of such project. This has become even 
more  important  with  public  services  at  the  heart  of  PFI 
procurement.  A  breakdown  in  these  services  would  not 
augur  well  for  government  and  the  people  it  serves, 
therefore internal capability of the public sector to monitor 
these  projects  and  report  them  efficiently  has  become 
necessary in order to provide credible information to the 
government  or  the  empowered  authority  to  take  rational 
decisions.  However,  in  order  to  solve  any  problem,  an 
acknowledgement  of  the  existence  of  that  problem  must 
come first. In this context, the evolution of PPP/PFI has 
brought  with  it  unique challenges  which the  government 
must live up to if it wants to retain the trust and loyalty of its 
citizens. Most PFI project failures have only come to light 
after a lot of damage has been done and the losses suffered 
in terms of social profits cannot be quantified in monetary 
terms to enable adequate compensation to be sought from 
the private provider or government. Therefore, it is in the 
interest of the governemnts to ensure that their bureaucracy 
are  well  equipped  to  help  prevent  these  failures  through 
improved skills in monitoring and reporting on the progress 
and performance of PFI projects. Around the world today, 
citizens are becoming more aware of their rights upon their 
government,  if  nothing,  the  recent  ‘Arab  Spring’  is  one 
‘party’ no government would want to be invited to!  
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